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Conceiving Open Systems
†
 
Christopher M. Kelty  
The great thing about standards is that there are so many to 
choose from.
1
 
Openness is an unruly concept. While free tends toward ambiguity 
(free as in speech, or free as in beer?), open tends toward obfuscation. 
Everyone claims to be open, everyone has something to share, 
everyone agrees that being open is the obvious thing to do-after all, 
openness is the other half of ―open source‖—but for all its 
obviousness, being ―open‖ is perhaps the most complex component 
of Free Software. It is never quite clear whether being open is a 
means or an end. Worse, the opposite of open in this case 
(specifically, ―open systems‖) is not closed, but ―proprietary‖—
signaling the complicated imbrication of the technical, the legal, and 
the commercial. 
In this Article I tell the story of the contest over the meaning of 
―open systems‖ from 1980 to 1993, a contest to create a 
simultaneously moral and technical infrastructure within the 
computer industry.
2
 The infrastructure in question includes technical 
 
 † This Article was published previously in substantially similar form as Chapter 5 of 
CHRISTOPHER M. KELTY, TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE 14378 
(2008), available at http://twobits.net/pub/Kelty-TwoBits.pdf. To aid the legal researcher, 
citations have been reformatted in conformance with THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF 
CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass‘n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). 
   Christopher M. Kelty is an associate professor at the University of California, Los 
Angeles. He has a joint appointment in the Center for Society and Genetics and in the 
department of Information Studies. His research focuses on the cultural significance of 
information technology, especially in science and engineering. He is the author most recently of 
TWO BITS: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE SOFTWARE, supra note †, as well as 
numerous articles on open source and free software, including its impact on education, 
nanotechnology, the life sciences, and issues of peer review and research process in the sciences 
and in the humanities. 
 1. T.A. CRITCHLEY & K.C. BATTY, OPEN SYSTEMS: THE REALITY 17 (1993); DON LIBES 
& SANDY RESSLER, LIFE WITH UNIX: A GUIDE FOR EVERYONE 67 (1989). 
 2. Moral in this usage signals the ―moral and social order‖ I explored through the 
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components—the UNIX operating system and the TCP/IP protocols 
of the Internet as open systems—but it also includes ―moral‖ 
components, including the demand for structures of fair and open 
competition, antimonopoly and open markets, and open-standards 
processes for high-tech networked computers and software in the 
1980s.
3
 By moral, I mean imaginations of the proper order of 
collective political and commercial action; referring to much more 
than simply how individuals should act, moral signifies a vision of 
how economy and society should be ordered collectively. 
The open-systems story is also a story of the blind spot of open 
systems—in that blind spot is intellectual property. The story reveals 
a tension between incompatible moral-technical orders: on the one 
hand, the promise of multiple manufacturers and corporations 
creating interoperable components and selling them in an open, 
heterogeneous market; on the other, an intellectual-property system 
that encouraged jealous guarding and secrecy, and granted monopoly 
status to source code, designs, and ideas in order to differentiate 
products and promote competition. The tension proved irresolvable: 
without shared source code, for instance, interoperable operating 
systems are impossible. Without interoperable operating systems, 
internetworking and portable applications are impossible. Without 
portable applications that can run on any system, open markets are 
impossible. Without open markets, monopoly power reigns. 
Standardization was at the heart of the contest, but by whom and 
by what means was never resolved. The dream of open systems, 
pursued in an entirely unregulated industry, resulted in a complicated 
experiment in novel forms of standardization and cooperation. The 
 
concept of social imaginaries in Chapter 1 of KELTY, supra note †, at 27–63. Or, in the Scottish 
Enlightenment sense of Adam Smith, it points to the right organization and relations of 
exchange among humans. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 
(2d ed. 1761). 
 3. There is, of course, a relatively robust discourse of open systems in biology, 
sociology, systems theory, and cybernetics; however, that meaning of open systems is more or 
less completely distinct from what openness and open systems came to mean in the computer 
industry in the period book-ended by the arrivals of the personal computer and the explosion of 
the Internet (ca. 1980–93). One relevant overlap between these two meanings can be found in 
the work of Carl Hewitt at the MIT Media Lab and in the interest in ―agorics‖ taken by K. Eric 
Drexler, Bernardo Huberman, and Mark S. Miller. See BERNARDO A. HUBERMAN, THE 
ECOLOGY OF COMPUTATION (B. A. Huberman ed., 1988).  
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creation of a ―standard‖ operating system based on UNIX is the story 
of a failure, a kind of ―figuring out‖ gone haywire, which resulted in 
huge consortia of computer manufacturers attempting to work 
together and compete with each other at the same time. Meanwhile, 
the successful creation of a ―standard‖ networking protocol—known 
as the Open Systems Interconnection Reference Model (―OSI‖)—is a 
story of failure that hides a larger success; OSI was eclipsed in the 
same period by the rapid and ad hoc adoption of the Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (―TCP/IP‖), which used a radically 
different standardization process and which succeeded for a number 
of surprising reasons, allowing the Internet to take the form it did in 
the 1990s and ultimately exemplifying the moral-technical 
imagination of a recursive public—and one at the heart of the 
practices of Free Software. 
The conception of openness, which is the central plot of these two 
stories, has become an essential component of the contemporary 
practice and power of Free Software. These early battles created a 
kind of widespread readiness for Free Software in the 1990s, a 
recognition of Free Software as a removal of open systems‘ blind 
spot, as much as an exploitation of its power. The geek ideal of 
openness and a moral-technical order (the one that made Napster so 
significant an event) was forged in the era of open systems; without 
this concrete historical conception of how to maintain openness in 
technical and moral terms, the recursive public of geeks would be just 
another hierarchical closed organization—a corporation manqué—
and not an independent public serving as a check on the kinds of 
destructive power that dominated the open-systems contest. 
I. HOPELESSLY PLURAL 
Big iron, silos, legacy systems, turnkey systems, dinosaurs, 
mainframes: with the benefit of hindsight, the computer industry of 
the 1960s to the 1980s appears to be backward and closed, to have 
literally painted itself into a corner, as an early Intel advertisement 
suggests.
4
 Contemporary observers who show disgust and impatience 
 
 4. Intel, Advertisement, The Difference Between an Open System and Everything Else, 
WALL ST. J., May 30, 1984, at 15, reprinted in KELTY, supra note †, at 146. 
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with the form that computers took in this era are without fail 
supporters of open systems and opponents of proprietary systems that 
―lock in‖ customers to specific vendors and create artificial demands 
for support, integration, and management of resources. Open systems 
(if allowed to flourish) would solve all these problems. 
Given the promise of a ―general-purpose computer,‖ it should 
seem ironic at best that open systems needed to be created. But the 
general-purpose computer never came into being. We do not live in 
the world of ―The Computer,‖ but in a world of computers: myriad, 
incompatible, specific machines. The design of specialized machines 
(or ―architectures‖) was, and still is, key to a competitive industry in 
computers. It required CPUs and components and associated software 
that could be clearly qualified and marketed as distinct products: the 
DEC PDP-11 or the IBM 360 or the CDC 6600. On the Fordist model 
of automobile production, the computer industry‘s mission was to 
render desired functions (scientific calculation, bookkeeping, 
reservations management) in a large box with a button on it (or a very 
large number of buttons on increasingly smaller boxes). Despite the 
theoretical possibility, such computers were not designed to do 
anything, but, rather, to do specific kinds of calculations exceedingly 
well. They were objects customized to particular markets. 
The marketing strategy was therefore extremely stable from about 
1955 to about 1980: identify customers with computing needs, build 
a computer to serve them, provide them with all of the equipment, 
software, support, or peripherals they need to do the job—and charge 
a large amount. Organizationally speaking, it was an industry 
dominated by ―IBM and the seven dwarfs‖: Hewlett-Packard, 
Honeywell, Control Data, General Electric, NCR, RCA, Univac, and 
Burroughs, with a few upstarts like DEC in the wings. 
By the 1980s, however, a certain inversion had happened. 
Computers had become smaller and faster; there were more and more 
of them, and it was becoming increasingly clear to the ―big iron‖ 
manufacturers that what was most valuable to users was the 
information they generated, not the machines that did the generating. 
Such a realization, so the story goes, leads to a demand for 
interchangeability, interoperability, information sharing, and 
networking. It also presents the nightmarish problems of conversion 
between a bewildering, heterogeneous, and rapidly growing array of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/7
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hardware, software, protocols, and systems. As one conference paper 
on the subject of evaluating open systems put it, ―At some point a 
large enterprise will look around and see a huge amount of equipment 
and software that will not work together. Most importantly, the 
information stored on these diverse platforms is not being shared, 
leading to unnecessary duplication and lost profit.‖5 
Open systems emerged in the 1980s as the name of the solution to 
this problem: an approach to the design of systems that, if all 
participants were to adopt it, would lead to widely interoperable, 
integrated machines that could send, store, process, and receive the 
user‘s information. In marketing and public-relations terms, it would 
provide ―seamless integration.‖ 
In theory, open systems was simply a question of standards 
adoption. For instance, if all the manufacturers of UNIX systems 
could be convinced to adopt the same basic standard for the operating 
system, then seamless integration would naturally follow as all the 
various applications could be written once to run on any variant 
UNIX system, regardless of which company made it. In reality, such 
a standard was far from obvious, difficult to create, and even more 
difficult to enforce. As such, the meaning of open systems was 
―hopelessly plural,‖ and the term came to mean an incredibly diverse 
array of things. 
―Openness‖ is precisely the kind of concept that wavers between 
end and means. Is openness good in itself, or is openness a means to 
achieve something else—and if so what? Who wants to achieve 
openness, and for what purpose? Is openness a goal? Or is it a means 
by which a different goal—say, ―interoperability‖ or ―integration‖—
is achieved? Whose goals are these, and who sets them? Are the 
goals of corporations different from or at odds with the goals of 
university researchers or government officials? Are there large 
central visions to which the activities of all are ultimately 
subordinate? 
Between 1980 and 1993, no person or company or computer 
industry consortium explicitly set openness as the goal at which 
 
 5. Brian William Keves, Open Systems Formal Evaluation Process (Nov. 4, 1993), in 
USENIX SEVENTH SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION CONFERENCE (LISA ‘93) 87 (1993), available at 
http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/lisa93/full_papers/keves.pdf. 
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organizations, corporations, or programmers should aim, but, by the 
same token, hardly anyone dissented from the demand for openness. 
As such, it appears clearly as a kind of cultural imperative, reflecting 
a longstanding social imagination with roots in liberal democratic 
notions, versions of a free market and ideals of the free exchange of 
knowledge, but confronting changed technical conditions that bring 
the moral ideas of order into relief, and into question. 
In the 1980s everyone seemed to want some kind of openness, 
whether among manufacturers or customers, from General Motors to 
the armed forces.
6
 The debates, both rhetorical and technical, about 
the meaning of open systems have produced a slough of writings, 
largely directed at corporate IT managers and CIOs. For instance, 
Terry A. Critchley and K. C. Batty, the authors of Open Systems: The 
Reality,
7
 claim to have collected over a hundred definitions of open 
systems. The definitions stress different aspects—from 
interoperability of heterogeneous machines, to compatibility of 
different applications, to portability of operating systems, to 
legitimate standards with open-interface definitions—including those 
that privilege ideologies of a free market, as does Bill Gates‘s 
definition: ―There‘s nothing more open than the PC market. . . . 
[U]sers can choose the latest and greatest software.‖8 The range of 
meanings was huge and oriented along multiple axes: what, to whom, 
how, and so on. Open systems could mean that source code was open 
to view or that only the specifications or interfaces were; it could 
mean ―available to certain third parties‖ or ―available to everyone, 
including competitors‖; it could mean self-publishing, well-defined 
interfaces and application programming interfaces (APIs), or it could 
mean sticking to standards set by governments and professional 
societies. To cynics, it simply meant that the marketing department 
liked the word open and used it a lot. 
 
 6. General Motors stirred strong interest in open systems by creating, in 1985, its 
Manufacturing Automation Protocol (―MAP‖), which was built on Unix. At the time, General 
Motors was the second-largest purchaser of computer equipment after the government. The 
Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force also adopted and required POSIX-compliant 
Unix systems early on.  
 7. CRITCHLEY & BATTY, supra note 1. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
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One part of the definition, however, was both consistent and 
extremely important: the opposite of an ―open system‖ was not a 
―closed system‖ but a ―proprietary system.‖ In industries other than 
networking and computing the word proprietary will most likely have 
a positive valence, as in ―our exclusive proprietary technology.‖ But 
in the context of computers and networks such a usage became 
anathema in the 1980s and 1990s; what customers reportedly wanted 
was a system that worked nicely with other systems, and that system 
had to be by definition open since no single company could provide 
all of the possible needs of a modern business or government agency. 
And even if it could, it shouldn‘t be allowed to. For instance: 
In the beginning was the word and the word, was 
―proprietary.‖ I.B.M. showed the way, purveying machines 
that existed in splendid isolation. They could not be operated 
using programs written for any other make of computer; they 
could not communicate with the machines of competitors.  
 If your company started out buying computers of various 
sizes from the International Business Machines Corporation 
because it was the biggest and the best, you soon found 
yourself locked as securely to Big Blue as any manacled 
wretch in a medieval dungeon. When an I.B.M. rival unveiled 
a technologically advanced product, you could only sigh; it 
might be years before the new technology showed up in the 
I.B.M. line.
9
 
With the exception of IBM (and to some extent its closest 
competitors: Hewlett-Packard, Burroughs, and Unisys), computer 
corporations in the 1980s sought to distance themselves from such 
―medieval‖ proprietary solutions (such talk also echoes that of usable 
pasts of the Protestant Reformation often used by geeks). New firms 
like Sun and Apollo deliberately berated the IBM model. Bill Joy 
reportedly called one of IBM‘s new releases in the 1980s a ―grazing 
 
 9. Cheryll Aimee Barron, The Gospel According to Joy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1988 
(Sunday Magazine), at 28. 
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dinosaur ‗with a truck outside pumping its bodily fluids through 
it.‘‖10 
Open systems was never a simple solution though: all that 
complexity in hardware, software, components, and peripherals could 
only be solved by pushing hard for standards—even for a single 
standard. Or, to put it differently, during the 1980s, everyone agreed 
that open systems was a great idea, but no one agreed on which open 
systems. As one of the anonymous speakers in Open Systems: The 
Reality puts it, ―[i]t took me a long time to understand what (the 
industry) meant by open vs. proprietary, but I finally figured it out. 
From the perspective of any one supplier, open meant ‗our products.‘ 
Proprietary meant ‗everyone else‘s products.‘‖11 
For most supporters of open systems, the opposition between open 
and proprietary had a certain moral force: it indicated that 
corporations providing the latter were dangerously close to being 
evil, immoral, perhaps even criminal monopolists. Although there are 
no doubt arguments for closed systems—security, privacy, 
robustness, control—the demand for interoperability does not mean 
that such closure will be sacrificed.
12
 Closure was also a choice. That 
is, open systems was an issue of sovereignty, involving the right, in a 
moral sense, of a customer to control a technical order hemmed in by 
firm standards that allowed customers to combine a number of 
different pieces of hardware and software purchased in an open 
market and to control the configuration themselves—not enforced 
openness, but the right to decide oneself on whether and how to be 
open or closed. 
The open-systems idea of moral order conflicts, however, with an 
idea of moral order represented by intellectual property: the right, 
encoded in law, to assert ownership over and control particular bits of 
source code, software, and hardware. The call for and the market in 
 
 10. Dinosaur, in THE ON-LINE HACKER JARGON FILE (Eric Raymond ed., version 4.4.7 
2003), http://catb.org/jargon/html/D/dinosaur.html. 
 11. CRICHTLEY & BATTY, supra note 1, at 10.  
 12. An excellent counterpoint here is PAUL N. EDWARDS, THE CLOSED WORLD: 
COMPUTERS AND THE POLITICS OF DISCOURSE IN COLD WAR AMERICA (1996). It clearly 
demonstrates the appeal of a thoroughly and hierarchically controlled system such as the Semi-
Automated Ground Environment (―SAGE‖) of the Department of Defense against the 
emergence of more ―green world‖ models of openness. Id. at 75–111. 
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open systems were never imagined as being opposed to intellectual 
property as such, even if the opposition between open and proprietary 
seemed to indicate a kind of subterranean recognition of the role of 
intellectual property. The issue was never explicitly broached. Of the 
hundred definitions in Open Systems, only one definition comes 
close to including legal issues: ―Speaker at Interop ‗90 (paraphrased 
and maybe apocryphal): ‗If you ask to gain access to a technology 
and the response you get back is a price list, then that technology is 
‗open.‘ If what you get back is a letter from a lawyer, then it‘s not 
‗open.‘‘‖13 
Openness here is not equated with freedom to copy and modify, 
but with the freedom to buy access to any aspect of a system without 
signing a contract, a nondisclosure agreement, or any other legal 
document besides a check. The ground rules of competition are 
unchallenged: the existing system of intellectual property—a system 
that was expanded and strengthened in this period—was a sine qua 
non of competition. 
Openness understood in this manner means an open market in 
which it is possible to buy standardized things that are neither 
obscure nor secret, but can be examined and judged—a ―commodity‖ 
market, where products have functions, where quality is comparable 
and forms the basis for vigorous competition. What this notion 
implies is freedom from monopoly control by corporations over 
products, a freedom that is nearly impossible to maintain when the 
entire industry is structured around the monopoly control of 
intellectual property through trade secret, patent, or copyright. The 
blind spot hides the contradiction between an industry imagined on 
the model of manufacturing distinct and tangible products, and the 
reality of an industry that wavers somewhere between service and 
product, dealing in intangible intellectual property whose boundaries 
and identity are in fact defined by how they are exchanged, 
circulated, and shared, as in the case of the proliferation and 
differentiation of the UNIX operating system. 
There was no disagreement about the necessity of intellectual 
property in the computer industry of the 1980s, and there was no 
 
 13. CRICHTLEY & BATTY, supra note 1, at 13.  
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perceived contradiction in the demands for openness. Indeed, 
openness could only make sense if it were built on top of a stable 
system of intellectual property that allowed competitors to maintain 
clear definitions of the boundaries of their products. But the creation 
of interoperable components seemed to demand a relaxation of the 
secrecy and guardedness necessary to ―protect‖ intellectual property. 
Indeed, for some observers, the problem of openness created the 
opportunity for the worst kinds of cynical logic, as in this example 
from Regis McKenna‘s Who‟s Afraid of Big Blue? 
Users want open environments, so the vendors had better 
comply. In fact, it is a good idea to support new standards 
early. That way, you can help control the development of the 
standards. Moreover, you can take credit for driving the 
standard. Supporting standards is a way to demonstrate that 
you‘re on the side of users.  
 On the other hand, companies can not compete on the basis 
of standards alone. Companies that live by standards can die 
by standards. Other companies, adhering to the same 
standards, could win on the basis of superior manufacturing 
technology. If companies do nothing but adhere to standards, 
then all computers will become commodities, and nobody will 
be able to make any money.  
 Thus, companies must keep something proprietary, 
something to differentiate their products.
14
 
By such an account, open systems would be tantamount to 
economic regression, a state of pure competition on the basis of 
manufacturing superiority, and not on the basis of the competitive 
advantage granted by the monopoly of intellectual property, the clear 
hallmark of a high-tech industry.
15
 It was an irresolvable tension 
 
 14. REGIS MCKENNA, WHO‘S AFRAID OF BIG BLUE? HOW COMPANIES ARE 
CHALLENGING IBM—AND WINNING 178 (1989). McKenna goes on to suggest that computer 
companies can differentiate themselves by adding services, better interfaces, or higher 
reliability—ironically similar to arguments that the Open Source Initiative would make ten 
years later. Id. 
 15. Richard Stallman, echoing the image of medieval manacled wretches, characterized 
the blind spot thus:  
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between the desire for a cooperative, market-based infrastructure and 
the structure of an intellectual-property system ill-suited to the 
technical realities within which companies and customers operated—
a tension revealing the reorientation of knowledge and power with 
respect to creation, dissemination, and modification of knowledge. 
From the perspective of intellectual property, ideas, designs, and 
source code are everything—if a company were to release the source 
code, and allow other vendors to build on it, then what exactly would 
they be left to sell? Open systems did not mean anything like free, 
open source, or public domain computing. But the fact that 
competition required some form of collaboration was obvious as 
well: standard software and network systems were needed; standard 
markets were needed; standard norms of innovation within the 
constraints of standards were needed. In short, the challenge was not 
just the creation of competitive products but the creation of a 
standard infrastructure, dealing with the technical questions of 
availability, modifiability, and reusability of components, and the 
moral questions of the proper organization of competition and 
collaboration across diverse domains: engineers, academics, the 
computer industry, and the industries it computerized. What follows 
is the story of how UNIX entered the open-systems fray, a story in 
which the tension between the conceiving of openness and the 
demands of intellectual property is revealed. 
II. OPEN SYSTEMS ONE: OPERATING SYSTEMS 
In 1980 UNIX was by all accounts the most obvious choice for a 
standard operating system for a reason that seemed simple at the 
outset: it ran on more than one kind of hardware. It had been installed 
 
Unix does not give the user any more legal freedom than Windows does. What they 
mean by ―open systems‖ is that you can mix and match components, so you can decide 
to have, say, a Sun chain on your right leg and some other company‘s chain on your 
left leg, and maybe some third company‘s chain on your right arm, and this is 
supposed to be better than having to choose to have Sun chains on all of your limbs, or 
Microsoft chains on all of your limbs. You know, I don‘t care whose chains are on 
each limb. What I want is not to be chained by anyone. 
Interview by Michael Gross with Richard Stallman, in N.Y., N.Y., and Cambridge, Mass. 
(1999), available at http://www.mgross.com/MoreThgsChng/interviews/stallman5.html.  
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on DEC machines and IBM machines and Intel processors and 
Motorola processors—a fact exciting to many professional 
programmers, university computer scientists, and system 
administrators, many of whom also considered UNIX to be the best 
designed of the available operating systems. 
There was a problem, however (there always is): UNIX belonged 
to AT&T, and AT&T had licensed it to multiple manufacturers over 
the years, in addition to allowing the source code to circulate more or 
less with abandon throughout the world and to be ported to a wide 
variety of different machine architectures. Such proliferation, albeit 
haphazard, was a dream come true: a single, interoperable operating 
system running on all kinds of hardware. Unfortunately, proliferation 
would also undo that dream, because it meant that as the markets for 
workstations and operating systems heated up, the existing versions 
of UNIX hardened into distinct and incompatible versions with 
different features and interfaces. By the mid 1980s, there were 
multiple competing efforts to standardize UNIX, an endeavour that 
eventually went haywire, resulting in the so-called UNIX wars, in 
which ―gangs‖ of vendors (some on both sides of the battle) teamed 
up to promote competing standards. The story of how this happened 
is instructive, for it is a story that has been reiterated several times in 
the computer industry.
16
 
As a hybrid commercial-academic system, UNIX never entered 
the market as a single thing. It was licensed in various ways to 
different people, both academic and commercial, and contained 
additions and tools and other features that may or may not have 
originated at (or been returned to) Bell Labs. By the early 1980s, the 
Berkeley Software Distribution version was in fact competing with 
the AT&T version, even though BSD was a sublicensee—and it was 
not the only one. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, a number of 
corporations had licensed UNIX from AT&T for use on new 
machines. Microsoft licensed it (and called it Xenix, rather than 
 
 16. A similar story can be told about the emergence, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, of 
manufacturers of ―plug-compatible‖ devices, peripherals that plugged into IBM machines. See 
Shigeru Takahashi, The Rise and Fall of the Plug-Compatible Mainframes, IEEE ANNALS 
HIST. COMPUTING, Jan.–Mar. 2005, at 4, 4–16. Similarly, in the 1990s the story of browser 
compatibility and the World Wide Web Consortium (―W3C‖) standards is another 
recapitulation.  
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licensing the name UNIX as well) to be installed on Intel-based 
machines. IBM, Unisys, Amdahl, Sun, DEC, and Hewlett-Packard all 
followed suit and created their own versions and names: HP-UX, 
A/UX, AIX, Ultrix, and so on. Given the ground rules of trade 
secrecy and intellectual property, each of these licensed versions 
needed to be made legally distinct if they were to compete with each 
other. Even if UNIX remained conceptually pure in an academic or 
pedagogical sense, every manufacturer would nonetheless have to 
tweak, to extend, to optimize in order to differentiate. After all, ―[i]f 
companies do nothing but adhere to standards, then all computers 
will become commodities, and nobody will be able to make any 
money.‖17 
It was thus unlikely that any of these corporations would 
contribute the changes they made to UNIX back into a common pool, 
and certainly not back to AT&T, which subsequent to the 1984 
divestiture finally released their own commercial version of UNIX, 
called UNIX System V. Very quickly, the promising ―open‖ UNIX of 
the 1970s became a slough of alternative operating systems, each 
incompatible with the next thanks to the addition of market-
differentiating features and hardware-specific tweaks. According to 
Pamela Gray, ―[b]y the mid-1980s, there were more than 100 
versions in active use‖ centered around the three market leaders, 
AT&T‘s System V, Microsoft/SCO Xenix, and the BSD.18 By 1984, 
the differences in systems had become significant—as in the case of 
the BSD additions of the TCP/IP protocols, the vi editor, and the 
Pascal compiler—and created not only differentiation in terms of 
quality but also incompatibility at both the software and networking 
levels. 
Different systems of course had different user communities, based 
on who was the customer of whom. Eric Raymond suggests that in 
the mid-1980s, independent hackers, programmers, and computer 
scientists largely followed the fortunes of BSD:  
 
 17. MCKENNA, supra note 14, at 178.  
 18. PAMELA GRAY, OPEN SYSTEMS: A BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S 75, 75 
(1991).  
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The divide was roughly between longhairs and shorthairs; 
programmers and technical people tended to line up with 
Berkeley and BSD, more business-oriented types with AT&T 
and System V. The longhairs, repeating a theme from Unix‘s 
early days ten years before, liked to see themselves as rebels 
against a corporate empire; one of the small companies put out 
a poster showing an X-wing-like space fighter marked ―BSD‖ 
speeding away from a huge AT&T ‗death star‘ logo left broken 
and in flames.
19
 
So even though UNIX had become the standard operating system 
of choice for time-sharing, multi-user, high-performance computers 
by the mid-1980s, there was no such thing as UNIX. Competitors in 
the UNIX market could hardly expect the owner of the system, 
AT&T, to standardize it and compete with them at the same time, and 
the rest of the systems were in some legal sense still derivations from 
the original AT&T system. Indeed, in its licensing pamphlets, AT&T 
even insisted that UNIX was not a noun, but an adjective, as in ―the 
UNIX system.‖20 
The dawning realization that the proliferation of systems was not 
only spreading UNIX around the world but also spreading it thin and 
breaking it apart led to a series of increasingly startling and high-
profile attempts to ―standardize‖ UNIX. Given that the three major 
branches (BSD, which would become the industry darling as Sun‘s 
Solaris operating system; Microsoft, and later SCO Xenix; and 
AT&T‘s System V) all emerged from the same AT&T and Berkeley 
work done largely by Thompson, Ritchie, and Joy, one would think 
that standardization would be a snap. It was anything but. 
III. FIGURING OUT GOES HAYWIRE 
Figuring out the moral and technical order of open systems went 
haywire around 1986-88, when there were no fewer than four 
 
 19. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE ART OF UNIX PROGRAMMING 35–42 (2004), available at 
http://www.faqs.org/docs/artu/ch02s01.html#id2880014. 
 20. LIBES & RESSLER, supra note 1, at 22; see also Andrew Tanenbaum, The Unix 
Marketplace in 1987: Life, the Universe and Everything (June 1987), in PROC. SUMMER 1987 
USENIX CONF., June 1987, at 419–24. 
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competing international standards, represented by huge consortia of 
computer manufacturers (many of whom belonged to multiple 
consortia): POSIX, the X/Open consortium, the Open Software 
Foundation, and UNIX International. The blind spot of open systems 
had much to do with this crazy outcome: academics, industry, and 
government could not find ways to agree on standardization. One 
goal of standardization was to afford customers choice; another was 
to allow competition unconstrained by ―artificial‖ means. A standard 
body of source code was impossible; a standard ―interface definition‖ 
was open to too much interpretation; government and academic 
standards were too complex and expensive; no particular 
corporation‘s standard could be trusted (because they could not be 
trusted to reveal it in advance of their own innovations); and worst of 
all, customers kept buying, and vendors kept shipping, and the world 
was increasingly filled with diversity, not standardization. 
UNIX proliferated quickly because of porting, leading to multiple 
instances of an operating system with substantially similar source 
code shared by academics and licensed by AT&T. But it 
differentiated just as quickly because of forking, as particular features 
were added to different ports. Some features were reincorporated into 
the ―main‖ branch—the one Thompson and Ritchie worked on—but 
the bulk of these mutations spread in a haphazard way, shared 
through users directly or implemented in newly formed commercial 
versions. Some features were just that, features, but others could 
extend the system in ways that might make an application possible on 
one version, but not on another. 
The proliferation and differentiation of UNIX, the operating 
system, had peculiar effects on the emerging market for UNIX, the 
product: technical issues entailed design and organizational issues. 
The original UNIX looked the way it did because of the very peculiar 
structure of the organization that created and sustained UNIX: Bell 
Labs and the worldwide community of users and developers. The 
newly formed competitors, conceiving of UNIX as a product distinct 
from the original UNIX, adopted it precisely because of its portability 
and because of the promise of open systems as an alternative to ―big 
iron‖ mainframes. But as UNIX was funneled into existing 
corporations with their own design and organizational structures, it 
started to become incompatible with itself, and the desire for 
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competition in open systems necessitated efforts at UNIX 
standardization. 
The first step in the standardization of open systems and UNIX 
was the creation of what was called an ―interface definition,‖ a 
standard that enumerated the minimum set of functions that any 
version of UNIX should support at the interface level, meaning that 
any programmer who wrote an application could expect to interact 
with any version of UNIX on any machine in the same way and get 
the same response from the machine (regardless of the specific 
implementation of the operating system or the source code that was 
used). Interface definitions, and extensions to them, were ideally to 
be published and freely available. 
The interface definition was a standard that emphasized 
portability, not at the source-code or operating-system level, but at 
the application level, allowing applications built on any version of 
UNIX to be installed and run on any other. The push for such a 
standard came first from a UNIX user group founded in 1980 by Bob 
Marsh and called, after the convention of file hierarchies in the UNIX 
interface, ―/usr/group‖ (later renamed Uniforum). The 1984 
/usr/group standard defined a set of system calls, which, however, 
―was immediately ignored and, for all practical purposes, useless.‖21 
It seemed the field was changing too fast and UNIX proliferating and 
innovating too widely for such a standard to work. 
The /usr/group standard nevertheless provided a starting point for 
more traditional standards organizations—the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers (―IEEE‖) and the American National 
Standards Institute (―ANSI‖)—to take on the task. Both institutions 
took the /usr/group standard as a basis for what would be called IEEE 
P1003 Portable Operating System Interface for Computer 
Environments (―POSIX‖). Over the next three years, from 1984 to 
1987, POSIX would work diligently at providing a standard interface 
definition for UNIX. 
Alongside this development, the AT&T version of UNIX became 
the basis for a different standard, the System V Interface Definition 
(―SVID‖), which attempted to standardize a set of functions similar 
 
 21. LIBES & RESSLER, supra note 1, at 67.  
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but not identical to the /usr/group and POSIX standards. Thus 
emerged two competing definitions for a standard interface to a 
system that was rapidly proliferating into hundreds of tiny operating-
system fiefdoms.
22
 The danger of AT&T setting the standard was not 
lost on any of the competing manufacturers. Even if they created a 
thoroughly open standard-interface definition, AT&T‘s version of 
UNIX would be the first to implement it, and they would continually 
have privileged knowledge of any changes: if they sought to change 
the implementation, they could change the standard; if they received 
demands that the standard be changed, they could change their 
implementation before releasing the new standard. 
In response to this threat, a third entrant into the standards race 
emerged: X/Open, which comprised a variety of European computer 
manufacturers (including AT&T!) and sought to develop a standard 
that encompassed both SVID and POSIX. The X/Open initiative 
grew out of European concern about the dominance of IBM and 
originally included Bull, Ericsson, ICL, Nixdorf, Olivetti, Philips, 
and Siemens. In keeping with a certain 1980s taste for the integration 
of European economic activity vis-à-vis the United States and Japan, 
these manufacturers banded together both to distribute a unified 
UNIX operating system in Europe (based initially on the BSD and 
Sun versions of UNIX) and to attempt to standardize it at the same 
time. 
X/Open represented a subtle transformation of standardization 
efforts and of the organizational definition of open systems. While 
the /usr/group standard was developed by individuals who used 
UNIX, and the POSIX standard by an acknowledged professional 
society (IEEE), the X/Open group was a collective of computer 
corporations that had banded together to fund an independent entity 
to help further the cause of a standard UNIX. This paradoxical 
situation—of a need to share a standard among all the competitors 
and the need to keep the details of that standardized product secret to 
maintain an advantage—was one that many manufacturers, especially 
 
 22. A case might be made that a third definition, the ANSI standard for the C 
programming language, also covered similar ground, which of course it would have had to in 
order to allow applications written on one operating system to be compiled and run on another. 
See GRAY, supra note 18, at 55–58; LIBES & RESSLER, supra note 1, at 70–75. 
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the Europeans with their long experience of IBM‘s monopoly, 
understood as mutually destructive. Hence, the solution was to 
engage in a kind of organizational innovation, to create a new form of 
metacorporate structure that could strategically position itself as at 
least temporarily interested in collaboration with other firms, rather 
than in competition. Thus did stories and promises of open systems 
wend their way from the details of technical design to those of 
organizational design to the moral order of competition and 
collaboration, power and strategy. ―Standards‖ became products that 
corporations sought to ―sell‖ to their own industry through the 
intermediary of the consortium. 
In 1985 and 1986 the disarrayed state of UNIX was also 
frustrating to the major U.S. manufacturers, especially to Sun 
Microsystems, which had been founded on the creation of a market 
for UNIX-based ―workstations,‖ high-powered networked computers 
that could compete with mainframes and personal computers at the 
same time. Founded by Bill Joy, Vinod Khosla, and Andreas 
Bechtolsheim, Sun had very quickly become an extraordinarily 
successful computer company. The business pages and magazines 
were keen to understand whether workstations were viable 
competitors to PCs, in particular to those of IBM and Microsoft, and 
the de facto standard DOS operating system, for which a variety of 
extremely successful business-, personal-, and home-computer 
applications were written. 
Sun seized on the anxiety around open systems, as is evident in 
the ad it ran during the summer of 1987.
23
 The ad plays subtly on two 
anxieties: the first is directed at the consumer and suggests that only 
with Sun can one actually achieve interoperability among all of one 
business‘ computers, much less across a network or industry; the 
second is more subtle and plays to fears within the computer industry 
itself, the anxiety that Sun might merge with one of the big 
corporations, AT&T or Unisys, and corner the market in open 
systems by producing the de facto standard.
24
 
 
 23. Sun Microsystems, Advertisement, Announcing the Biggest Merger in the Computer 
Business, WALL ST. J., July 9, 1987, at 11, reprinted in KELTY, supra note †, at 159. 
 24. Id., reprinted in KELTY, supra note †, at 159. 
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In fact, in October 1987 Sun announced that it had made a deal 
with AT&T. AT&T would distribute a workstation based on Sun‘s 
SPARC line of workstations and would acquire 20% of Sun.
25
 As 
part of this announcement, Sun and AT&T made clear that they 
intended to merge two of the dominant versions of UNIX on the 
market: AT&T‘s System V and the BSD-derived Solaris. This move 
clearly frightened the rest of the manufacturers interested in UNIX 
and open systems, as it suggested a kind of super-power alignment 
that would restructure (and potentially dominate) the market. A 1988 
article in the New York Times quotes an industry analyst who 
characterizes the merger as ―a matter of concern at the highest levels 
of every major computer company in the United States, and possibly 
the world,‖ and it suggests that competing manufacturers ―also fear 
that A.T.&T. will gradually make Unix a proprietary product, usable 
only on A.T.&T. or Sun machines.‖26 The industry anxiety was great 
enough that in March Unisys (a computer manufacturer, formerly 
Burroughs-Sperry) announced that it would work with AT&T and 
Sun to bring UNIX to its mainframes and to make its business 
applications run on UNIX. Such a move was tantamount to Unisys 
admitting that there would be no future in proprietary high-end 
computing—the business on which it had hitherto built its 
reputation—unless it could be part of the consortium that could own 
the standard.
27
 
In response to this perceived collusion a group of U.S. and 
European companies banded together to form another rival 
organization—one that partially overlapped with X/Open but now 
included IBM—this one called the Open Software Foundation. A 
nonprofit corporation, the foundation included IBM, Digital 
Equipment, Hewlett-Packard, Bull, Nixdorf, Siemens, and Apollo 
Computer (Sun‘s most direct competitor in the workstation market). 
Their goal was explicitly to create a ―competing standard‖ for UNIX 
that would be available on the hardware they manufactured (and 
 
 25. A.T.&T. Deal with Sun Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1987, at D8.  
 26. Thomas C. Hayes, A.T.&T.‟s Unix Is a Hit at Last, and Other Companies Are Wary, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1988, at D8.  
 27. Barnaby J. Feder, Unisys Obtains Pacts for Unix Capabilities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
1988, at D4.  
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based, according to some newspaper reports, on IBM‘s AIX, which 
was to be called OSF/1). AT&T appeared at first to support the 
foundation, suggesting that if the Open Software Foundation could 
come up with a standard, then AT&T would make System V 
compatible with it. Thus, 1988 was the summer of open love. Every 
major computer manufacturer in the world was now part of some 
consortium or another, and some were part of two—each promoting a 
separate standard. 
Of all the corporations, Sun did the most to brand itself as the 
originator of the open-systems concept. They made very broad claims 
for the success of open-systems standardization, as for instance in an 
ad from August 1988, which stated in part: 
But what‘s more, those sales confirm a broad acceptance of the 
whole idea behind Sun. 
 The Open Systems idea. Systems based on standards so 
universally accepted that they allow combinations of hardware 
and software from literally thousands of independent 
vendors. . . . So for the first time, you‘re no longer locked into 
the company who made your computers. Even if it‘s us.28 
The ad goes on to suggest that ―in a free market, the best products 
win out,‖ even as Sun played both sides of every standardization 
battle, cooperating with both AT&T and with the Open Software 
Foundation.
29
 But by October of that year, it was clear to Sun that the 
idea hadn‘t really become ―so universal‖ just yet. In that month 
AT&T and Sun banded together with seventeen other manufacturers 
and formed a rival consortium: Unix International, a coalition of the 
willing that would back the AT&T UNIX System V version as the 
one true open standard. In a full-page advertisement from Halloween 
of 1988, run simultaneously in the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and the Wall Street Journal, the rhetoric of achieved success 
remained, but now instead of ―the Open Systems idea,‖ it was ―your 
demand for UNIX System V-based solutions that ushered in the era 
 
 28. Sun Microsystems, Advertisement, It Pays to Be Open, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1988, at 
D3, reprinted in KELTY, supra note †, at 161. 
 29. Id., reprinted in KELTY, supra note †, at 161. 
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of open architecture.‖30 Instead of a standard for all open systems, it 
was a war of all against all, a war to assure customers that they had 
made, not the right choice of hardware or software, but the right 
choice of standard. 
The proliferation of standards and standards consortia is often 
referred to as the UNIX wars of the late 1980s, but the creation of 
such consortia did not indicate clearly drawn lines. Another metaphor 
that seems to have been very popular in the press at the time was that 
of ―gang‖ warfare (no doubt helped along by the creation of another 
industry consortia informally called the Gang of Nine, which were 
involved in a dispute over whether MicroChannel or EISA buses 
should be installed in PCs). The idea of a number of companies 
forming gangs to fight with each other, Bloods-and-Crips style—or 
perhaps more Jets-and-Sharks style, minus the singing—was no 
doubt an appealing metaphor at the height of Los Angeles‘s very real 
and high-profile gang warfare. But as one article in the New York 
Times pointed out, these were strange gangs:  
Since ―openness‖ and ―cooperation‖ are the buzzwords behind 
these alliances, the gang often asks its enemy to join. Often the 
enemy does so, either so that it will not seem to be opposed to 
openness or to keep tabs on the group. I.B.M. was invited to 
join the corporation for Open Systems, even though the clear if 
unstated motive of the group was to dilute I.B.M.‘s influence 
in the market. A.T.&T. negotiated to join the Open Software 
Foundation, but the talks collapsed recently.  
 Some companies find it completely consistent to be 
members of rival gangs. . . . About 10 companies are members 
of both the Open Software Foundation and its archrival, Unix 
International.
31
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Not Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1988, at D3, reprinted in KELTY, supra note †, at 163. 
 31. Andrew Pollack, Computer „Gangs‟ Stake Out Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1988, at 
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The proliferation of these consortia can be understood in various 
ways. One could argue that they emerged at a time-during the Reagan 
administration—when antitrust policing had diminished to the point 
where computer corporations did not see such collusion as a risky 
activity vis-à-vis antitrust policing. One could also argue that these 
consortia represented a recognition that the focus on hardware control 
(the meaning of proprietary) had been replaced with a focus on the 
control of the ―open standard‖ by one or several manufacturers, that 
is, that competition was no longer based on superior products, but on 
―owning the standard.‖ It is significant that the industry consortia 
quickly overwhelmed national efforts, such as the IEEE POSIX 
standard, in the media—an indication that no one was looking to 
government or nonprofits, or to university professional societies, to 
settle the dispute by declaring a standard, but rather to industry itself 
to hammer out a standard, de facto or otherwise. Yet another way to 
understand the emergence of these consortia is as a kind of mutual 
policing of the market, a kind of paranoid strategy of showing each 
other just enough to make sure that no one would leapfrog ahead and 
kill the existing, fragile competition. 
What this proliferation of UNIX standards and consortia most 
clearly represents, however, is the blind spot of open systems: the 
difficulty of having collaboration and competition at the same time in 
the context of intellectual-property rules that incompletely capture the 
specific and unusual characteristics of software. For participants in 
this market, the structure of intellectual property was unassailable—
without it, most participants assumed, innovation would cease and 
incentives disappear. Despite the fact that secrecy haunted the 
industry, its customers sought both openness and compatibility. 
These conflicting demands proved irresolvable. 
IV. DENOUEMENT 
Ironically, the UNIX wars ended not with the emergence of a 
winner, but with the reassertion of proprietary computing: Microsoft 
Windows and Windows NT. Rather than open systems emerging 
victorious, ushering in the era of seamless integration of diverse 
components, the reverse occurred: Microsoft managed to grab a huge 
share of computer markets, both desktop and high-performance, by 
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leveraging its brand, the ubiquity of DOS, and application-software 
developers‘ dependence on the ―Wintel‖ monster (Windows plus 
Intel chips). Microsoft triumphed, largely for the same reasons the 
open-systems dream failed: the legal structure of intellectual property 
favored a strong corporate monopoly on a single, branded product 
over a weak array of ―open‖ and competing components. There was 
no large gain to investors, or to corporations, from an industry of nice 
guys sharing the source code and making the components work 
together. Microsoft, on the other hand, had decided to do so internal 
to itself; it did not necessarily need to form consortia or standardize 
its operating systems, if it could leverage its dominance in the market 
to spread the operating system far and wide. It was, as standards 
observers like to say, the triumph of de facto standardization over de 
jure. It was a return to the manacled wretches of IBM‘s monopoly—
but with a new dungeon master. 
The denouement of the UNIX standards story was swift: AT&T 
sold its UNIX System Labs (including all of the original source and 
rights) to Novell in 1993, who sold it in turn to SCO two years later. 
Novell sold (or transferred) the trademark name UNIX™ to the 
X/Open group, which continued to fight for standardization, 
including a single universal UNIX specification. In 1996 X/Open and 
the Open Software Foundation merged to form the Open Group.
32
 
The Open Group eventually joined forces with IEEE to turn POSIX 
into a single UNIX specification in 2001. They continue to push the 
original vision of open systems, though they carefully avoid using the 
name or concept, referring instead to the trademarked mouthful 
―Boundaryless Information Flow‖ and employing an updated and 
newly inscrutable rhetoric: ―Boundaryless Information Flow, a 
shorthand representation of ‗access to integrated information to 
support business process improvements‘ represents a desired state of 
an enterprise‘s infrastructure and is specific to the business needs of 
the organization.‖33 
 
 32. The Unix System—History and Timeline, http://www.unix.org/what_is_unix/history_ 
timeline.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
 33. The Open Group Vision and Mission, http://www.opengroup.org/overview/vision-
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The Open Group, as well as many other participants in the history 
of open systems, recognize the emergence of ―open source‖ as a 
return to the now one true path of boundaryless information flow. 
Eric Raymond, of course, sees continuity and renewal (not least of 
which is in his own participation in the Open Source movement) and 
in his Art of UNIX Programming says, ―The Open Source movement 
is building on this stable foundation and is creating a resurgence of 
enthusiasm for the UNIX philosophy. In many ways Open Source 
can be seen as the true delivery of Open Systems that will ensure it 
continues to go from strength to strength.‖34 
This continuity, of course, deliberately disavows the centrality of 
the legal component, just as Raymond and the Open Source Initiative 
had in 1998. The distinction between a robust market in UNIX 
operating systems and a standard UNIX-based infrastructure on 
which other markets and other activities can take place still remains 
unclear even to those closest to the money and machines. It does not 
yet exist, and may well never come to. 
The growth of Free Software in the 1980s and 1990s depended on 
openness as a concept and component that was figured out during the 
UNIX wars. It was during these wars that the Free Software 
Foundation (and other groups, in different ways) began to recognize 
the centrality of the issue of intellectual property to the goal of 
creating an infrastructure for the successful creation of open 
systems.
35
 The GNU (GNU‘s Not Unix) project in particular, but also 
the X Windows system at MIT, the Remote Procedure Call and 
Network File System (―NFS‖) systems created by Sun, and tools like 
sendmail and BIND were each in their own way experiments with 
alternative licensing arrangements and were circulating widely on a 
variety of the UNIX versions in the late 1980s. Thus, the experience 
of open systems, while technically a failure as far as UNIX was 
concerned, was nonetheless a profound learning experience for an 
entire generation of engineers, hackers, geeks, and entrepreneurs. Just 
as the UNIX operating system had a pedagogic life of its own, 
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inculcating itself into the minds of engineers as the paradigm of an 
operating system, open systems had much the same effect, realizing 
an inchoate philosophy of openness, interconnection, compatibility, 
and interoperability—in short, availability and modifiability—that 
was in conflict with intellectual-property structures as they existed. 
To put it in Freudian terms: the neurosis of open systems was not 
cured, but the structure of its impossibility had become much clearer 
to everyone. UNIX, the operating system, did not disappear at all—
but UNIX, the market, did. 
V. OPEN SYSTEMS TWO: NETWORKS 
The struggle to standardize UNIX as a platform for open systems 
was not the only open-systems struggle; alongside the UNIX wars, 
another ―religious war‖ was raging. The attempt to standardize 
networks—in particular, protocols for the inter-networking of 
multiple, diverse, and autonomous networks of computers—was also 
a key aspect of the open-systems story of the 1980s.
36
 The war 
between the TCP/IP and OSI was also a story of failure and 
surprising success: the story of a successful standard with 
international approval (the OSI protocols) eclipsed by the 
experimental, military-funded TCP/IP, which exemplified an 
alternative and unusual standards process. The moral-technical orders 
expressed by OSI and TCP/IP are, like that of UNIX, on the border 
between government, university, and industry; they represent 
conflicting social imaginations in which power and legitimacy are 
organized differently and, as a result, expressed differently in the 
technology. 
OSI and TCP/IP started with different goals: OSI was intended to 
satisfy everyone, to be the complete and comprehensive model 
against which all competing implementations would be validated; 
 
 36. The distinction between a protocol, an implementation and a standard is important: 
Protocols are descriptions of the precise terms by which two computers can communicate (i.e., 
a dictionary and a handbook for communicating). An implementation is the creation of software 
that uses a protocol (i.e., actually does the communicating); thus two implementations using the 
same protocol should be able to share data. A standard defines which protocol should be used 
by which computers, and for what purposes. It may or may not define the protocol, but will set 
limits on changes to that protocol.  
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TCP/IP, by contrast, emphasized the easy and robust interconnection 
of diverse networks. TCP/IP is a protocol developed by bootstrapping 
between standard and implementation, a mode exemplified by the 
Requests for Comments system that developed alongside them as part 
of the Arpanet project. OSI was a ―model‖ or reference standard 
developed by internationally respected standards organizations. 
In the mid-1980s OSI was en route to being adopted 
internationally, but by 1993 it had been almost completely eclipsed 
by TCP/IP. The success of TCP/IP is significant for three reasons: (1) 
availability—TCP/IP was itself available via the network and 
development was open to anyone, whereas OSI was a 
bureaucratically confined and expensive standard and participation 
was confined to state and corporate representatives, organized 
through ISO in Geneva; (2) modifiability—TCP/IP could be copied 
from an existing implementation (such as the BSD version of UNIX) 
and improved, whereas OSI was a complex standard that had few 
existing implementations available to copy; and (3) serendipity—new 
uses that took advantage of availability and modifiability sprouted, 
including the ―killer app‖ that was the World Wide Web, which was 
built to function on existing TCP/IP—based networks, convincing 
many manufacturers to implement that protocol instead of, or in 
addition to, OSI. 
The success of TCP/IP over OSI was also significant because of 
the difference in the standardization processes that it exemplified. 
The OSI standard (like all official international standards) is 
conceived and published as an aid to industrial growth: it was 
imagined according to the ground rules of intellectual property and as 
an attempt to facilitate the expansion of markets in networking. OSI 
would be a ―vendor-neutral‖ standard: vendors would create their 
own, secret implementations that could be validated by OSI and 
thereby be expected to interoperate with other OSI-validated systems. 
By stark contrast, the TCP/IP protocols were not published (in any 
conventional sense), nor were the implementations validated by a 
legitimate international-standards organization; instead, the protocols 
are themselves represented by implementations that allow connection 
to the network itself (where the TCP/IP protocols and 
implementations are themselves made available). The fact that one 
can only join the network if one possesses or makes an 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/7
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implementation of the protocol is generally seen as the ultimate in 
validation: it works.
37
 In this sense, the struggle between TCP/IP and 
OSI is indicative of a very familiar twentieth-century struggle over 
the role and extent of government planning and regulation (versus 
entrepreneurial activity and individual freedom), perhaps best 
represented by the twin figures of Friedrich Hayek and Maynard 
Keynes. In this story, it is Hayek‘s aversion to planning and the 
subsequent privileging of spontaneous order that eventually triumphs, 
not Keynes‘s paternalistic view of the government as a neutral body 
that absorbs or encourages the swings of the market. 
VI. BOOTSTRAPPING NETWORKS 
The ―religious war‖ between TCP/IP and OSI occurred in the 
context of intense competition among computer manufacturers and 
during a period of vibrant experimentation with computer networks 
worldwide. As with most developments in computing, IBM was one 
of the first manufacturers to introduce a networking system for its 
machines in the early 1970s: the System Network Architecture 
(―SNA‖). DEC followed suit with Digital Network Architecture 
(―DECnet‖ or ―DNA‖), as did Univac with Distributed 
Communications Architecture (―DCA‖), Burroughs with Burroughs 
Network Architecture (―BNA‖), and others. These architectures were, 
like the proprietary operating systems of the same era, considered 
closed networks, networks that interconnected a centrally planned 
and specified number of machines of the same type or made by the 
same manufacturer. The goal of such networks was to make 
connections internal to a firm, even if that involved geographically 
widespread systems (e.g., from branch to headquarters). Networks 
were also to be products. 
The 1970s and 1980s saw extraordinarily vibrant experimentation 
with academic, military, and commercial networks. Robert Metcalfe 
had developed Ethernet at Xerox PARC in the mid-1970s, and IBM 
 
 37. The advantages of such an unplanned and unpredictable network have come to be 
identified in hindsight as a design principle. For an excellent analysis of the history of ―end to 
end‖ or ―stupid‖ networks, see Tarleton Gillespie, Engineering a Principle: End-to-End in the 
Design of the Internet, 36 SOC. STUD. SCI. 427, 441–50 (2006). 
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later created a similar technology called ―token ring.‖ In the 1980s 
the military discovered that the Arpanet was being used 
predominantly by computer scientists and not just for military 
applications, and decided to break it into MILNET and CSNET.
38
 
Bulletin Board Services, which connected PCs to each other via 
modems to download files, appeared in the late 1970s. Out of this 
grew Tom Jennings‘s very successful experiment called FidoNet.39 In 
the 1980s an existing social network of university faculty on the East 
Coast of the United States started a relatively successful network 
called BITNET (Because It‘s There Network) in the mid-1980s.40 
The Unix to Unix Copy Protocol (―uucp‖), which initially enabled 
the Usenet, was developed in the late 1970s and widely used until the 
mid-1980s to connect UNIX computers together. In 1984 the NSF 
began a program to fund research in networking and created the first 
large backbones for NSFNet, successor to the CSNET and Arpanet.
41
 
In the 1970s telecommunications companies and spin-off start-ups 
experimented widely with what were called ―videotex‖ systems, of 
which the most widely implemented and well known is Minitel in 
France.
42
 Such systems were designed for consumer users and often 
provided many of the now widespread services available on the 
Internet in a kind of embryonic form (from comparison shopping for 
cars, to directory services, to pornography).
43
 By the late 1970s, 
videotex systems were in the process of being standardized by the 
Commité Consultative de Information, Technologie et 
Télécommunications (―CCITT‖) at the International 
Telecommunications Union (―ITU‖) in Geneva. These standards 
 
 38. William J. Broad, Global Computer Network Split as Safeguard, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 
1983, at A13.  
 39. See DVD: BBS: The Documentary (Bovine Ignition Systems, 2005), available at 
http://www.bbsdocumentary.com/. 
 40. David Alan Grier & Mary Campbell, A Social History of Bitnet and Listserv 1985–
1991, IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING, Apr.–June 2000, at 32, 33. 
 41. See MICHAEL HAUBEN & RONDA HAUBEN, NETIZENS: ON THE HISTORY AND IMPACT 
OF USENET AND THE INTERNET (1997); see also Bryan Pfaffenberger, “A Standing Wave in the 
Web of Our Communications”: Usenet and the Socio-Technical Construction of Cyberspace 
Values, in FROM USENET TO COWEBS: INTERACTING WITH SOCIAL INFORMATION SPACES 20, 
20–43 (Christopher Lueg & Danyel Fisher eds., 2003). 
 42. SUSANNE K. SCHMIDT & RAYMUND WERLE, COORDINATING TECHNOLOGY: STUDIES 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 147–84 (1998).  
 43. See, e.g., JAMES MARTIN, VIEWDATA AND THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1982). 
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efforts would eventually be combined with work of the International 
Organization for Standardization (―ISO‖) on OSI, which had 
originated from work done at Honeywell.
44
 
One important feature united almost all of these experiments: the 
networks of the computer manufacturers were generally piggybacked, 
or bootstrapped, onto existing telecommunications infrastructures 
built by state-run or regulated monopoly telecommunications firms. 
This situation inevitably spelled grief, for telecommunications 
providers are highly regulated entities, while the computer industry 
has been almost totally unregulated from its inception. Since an 
increasingly core part of the computer industry‘s business involved 
transporting signals through telecommunications systems without 
being regulated to do so, the telecommunications industry naturally 
felt themselves at a disadvantage.
45
 Telecommunications companies 
were not slow to respond to the need for data communications, but 
their ability to experiment with products and practices outside the 
scope of telephony and telegraphy was often hindered by concerns 
about antitrust and monopoly.
46
 The unregulated computer industry, 
by contrast, saw the tentativeness of the telecommunications industry 
(or national PTTs) as either bureaucratic inertia or desperate attempts 
to maintain control and power over existing networks—though no 
computer manufacturer relished the idea of building their own 
physical network when so many already existed. 
TCP/IP and OSI have become emblematic of the split between the 
worlds of telecommunications and computing; the metaphors of 
religious wars or of blood feuds and cold wars were common.
47
 A 
 
 44. There is little information on the development of open systems; there is, however, a 
brief note from William Stallings, author of perhaps the most widely used textbook on 
networking. William Stallings, The Origins of OSI (1998), http://williamstallings.com/Extras/ 
OSI.html. 
 45. GERALD W. BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION (2003), is a good 
introductory source for this conflict, at least in its policy outlines. The Federal Communications 
Commission issued two decisions (known as ―Computer 1‖ and ―Computer 2‖) that attempted 
to deal with this conflict by trying to define what counted as voice communication and what as 
data. See In re Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & 
Commc‘n Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C. 2d 291 (1970) (known as Computer 1); In re Second 
Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384 (1980) (known as Computer 2), superseded by regulation 
as stated in In re N.J. Bell Telephone Co., 8 F.C.C.R. 5153 (1993). 
 46. See BROCK, supra note 45, at 170–85. 
 47. See, e.g., William J. Drake, The Internet Religious War, 17 TELECOMM. POL‘Y 643, 
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particularly arch account from this period is Carl Malamud‘s 
Exploring the Internet: A Technical Travelogue, which documents 
Malamud‘s (physical) visits to Internet sites around the globe, 
discussions (and beer) with networking researchers on technical 
details of the networks they have created, and his own typically 
geeky, occasionally offensive takes on cultural difference.
48
 A 
subtheme of the story is the religious war between Geneva (in 
particular the ITU) and the Internet: Malamud tells the story of 
asking the ITU to release its 19,000-page ―blue book‖ of standards on 
the Internet, to facilitate its adoption and spread.
49
 
The resistance of the ITU and Malamud‘s heroic if quixotic 
attempts are a parable of the moral-technical imaginaries of 
openness—and indeed, his story draws specifically on the usable past 
of Giordano Bruno.
50
 The ―bruno‖ project demonstrates the gulf that 
exists between two models of legitimacy—those of ISO and the 
ITU—in which standards represent the legal and legitimate consensus 
of a regulated industry, approved by member nations, paid for and 
enforced by governments, and implemented and adhered to by 
corporations. 
Opposite ISO is the ad hoc, experimental style of Arpanet and 
Internet researchers, in which standards are freely available and 
implementations represent the mode of achieving consensus, rather 
than the outcome of the consensus. In reality, such a rhetorical 
opposition is far from absolute: many ISO standards are used on the 
Internet, and ISO remains a powerful, legitimate standards 
organization. But the clash of established (telecommunications) and 
emergent (computer-networking) industries is an important context 
for understanding the struggle between OSI and TCP/IP. 
 
643–49 (1993). 
 48. CARL MALAMUD, EXPLORING THE INTERNET: A TECHNICAL TRAVELOGUE (1992); 
see also Michael M. J. Fischer, Worlding Cyberspace: Toward a Critical Ethnography in Time, 
Space, and Theory, in CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY NOW 245, 245–304 (George E. Marcus ed., 
1999). 
 49. MALAMUD, supra note 48, at 5. 
 50. The usable past of Giordano Bruno is invoked by Malamud to signal the heretical 
nature of his own commitment to openly publishing standards that ISO was opposed to 
releasing. Bruno‘s fate at the hands of the Roman Inquisition hinged in some part on his 
acceptance of the Copernican cosmology, so he has been, like Galileo, a natural figure for 
revolutionary claims during the 1990s. Id. at 35. 
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The need for standard networking protocols is unquestioned: 
interoperability is the bread and butter of a network. Nonetheless, the 
goals of the OSI and the TCP/IP protocols differed in important 
ways, with profound implications for the shape of that 
interoperability. OSI‘s goals were completeness, control, and 
comprehensiveness. OSI grew out of the telecommunications 
industry, which had a long history of confronting the vicissitudes of 
linking up networks and facilitating communication around the 
world, a problem that required a strong process of consensus and 
negotiation among large, powerful, government-run entities, as well 
as among smaller manufacturers and providers. OSI‘s feet were 
firmly planted in the international standardization organizations like 
OSI and the ITU (an organization as old as telecommunications itself, 
dating to the 1860s). 
Even if they were oft-mocked as slow, bureaucratic, or 
cumbersome, the processes of ISO and ITU-based in consensus, 
international agreement, and thorough technical specification—are 
processes of unquestioned legitimacy. The representatives of nations 
and corporations who attend ISO and ITU standards discussions, and 
who design, write, and vote on these standards, are usually not 
bureaucrats, but engineers and managers directly concerned with the 
needs of their constituency. The consensus-oriented process means 
that ISO and ITU standards attempt to satisfy all members‘ goals, and 
as such they tend to be very large, complex, and highly specific 
documents. They are generally sold to corporations and others who 
need to use them, rather than made freely available, a fact that until 
recently reflected their legitimacy, rather than lack thereof. 
TCP/IP, on the other hand, emerged from very different 
conditions.
51
 These protocols were part of a Department of Defense-
funded experimental research project: Arpanet. The initial Arpanet 
 
 51. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 133–45 (1999); BROCK, supra note 45, at 
146–51; ALEXANDER GALLOWAY, PROTOCOL: HOW CONTROL EXISTS AFTER 
DECENTRALIZATION 3–9 (2004); PETER H. SALUS, CASTING THE NET: FROM ARPANET TO 
INTERNET AND BEYOND (1995). For practitioner histories, see David D. Clark, The Design 
Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, in COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS: 
ARCHITECTURES, PROTOCOLS, AND STANDARDS 54, 54–62 (William Stallings ed., 1992); 
Robert Kahn et al., The Evolution of the Internet as a Global Information System, 29 INT‘L 
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Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:139 
 
 
protocols (the Network Control Protocol, or NCP) were insufficient, 
and TCP/IP was an experiment in interconnecting two different 
―packet-switched networks‖: the ground-line-based Arpanet network 
and a radio-wave network called Packet Radio.
52
 The problem facing 
the designers was not how to accommodate everyone, but merely 
how to solve a specific problem: interconnecting two technically 
diverse networks, each with autonomous administrative boundaries, 
but forcing neither of them to give up the system or the autonomy. 
Until the mid-1980s, the TCP/IP protocols were resolutely 
research-oriented, and not the object of mainstream commercial 
interest. Their development reflected a core set of goals shared by 
researchers and ultimately promoted by the central funding agency, 
the Department of Defense. The TCP/IP protocols are often referred 
to as enabling packet-switched networks, but this is only partially 
correct; the real innovation of this set of protocols was a design for an 
―inter-network,‖ a system that would interconnect several diverse and 
autonomous networks (packet-switched or circuit-switched), without 
requiring them to be transformed, redesigned, or standardized—in 
short, by requiring only standardization of the intercommunication 
between networks, not standardization of the network itself. In the 
first paper describing the protocol Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf 
motivated the need for TCP/IP thus:  
Even though many different and complex problems must be 
solved in the design of an individual packet-switching 
network, these problems are manifestly compounded when 
dissimilar networks are interconnected. Issues arise which may 
have no direct counterpart in an individual network and which 
strongly influence the way in which Internetwork 
communication can take place.
53
 
The explicit goal of TCP/IP was thus to share computer resources, 
not necessarily to connect two individuals or firms together, or to 
create a competitive market in networks or networking software. 
Sharing between different kinds of networks implied allowing the 
 
 52. See ABBATE, supra note 51, at 114–36; Kahn et al., supra note 51, at 134–40.  
 53. Vinton G. Cerf & Robert E. Kahn, A Protocol for Packet Network 
Intercommunication, 22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMM. 637, 637 (1974). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Conceiving Open Systems 171 
 
 
different networks to develop autonomously (as their creators and 
maintainers saw best), but without sacrificing the ability to continue 
sharing. Years later, David Clark, chief Internet engineer for several 
years in the 1980s, gave a much more explicit explanation of the 
goals that led to the TCP/IP protocols. In particular, he suggested that 
the main overarching goal was not just to share resources but ―to 
develop an effective technique for multiplexed utilization of existing 
interconnected networks,‖54 and he more explicitly stated the issue of 
control that faced the designers: ―[N]etworks represent administrative 
boundaries of control, and it was an ambition of this project to come 
to grips with the problem of integrating a number of separately 
administrated entities into a common utility.‖55 By placing the goal of 
expandability first, the TCP/IP protocols were designed with a 
specific kind of simplicity in mind: the test of the protocols‘ success 
was simply the ability to connect. 
By setting different goals, TCP/IP and OSI thus differed in terms 
of technical details; but they also differed in terms of their context 
and legitimacy, one being a product of international-standards bodies, 
the other of military-funded research experiments. The technical and 
organizational differences imply different processes for 
standardization, and it is the peculiar nature of the so-called Requests 
for Comments (―RFC‖) process that gave TCP/IP one of its most 
distinctive features. The RFC system is widely recognized as a 
unique and serendipitous outcome of the research process of 
Arpanet.
56
 In a thirty-year retrospective (published, naturally, as an 
RFC: RFC 2555), Vinton Cerf says, ―Hiding in the history of the 
RFCs is the history of human institutions for achieving cooperative 
work.‖57 He goes on to describe their evolution over the years:  
When the RFCs were first produced, they had an almost 19th 
century character to them—letters exchanged in public 
debating the merits of various design choices for protocols in 
 
 54. Clark, supra note 51, at 54. 
 55. Id. at 55.  
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editor.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
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the ARPANET. As email and bulletin boards emerged from 
the fertile fabric of the network, the far-flung participants in 
this historic dialog began to make increasing use of the online 
medium to carry out the discussion—reducing the need for 
documenting the debate in the RFCs and, in some respects, 
leaving historians somewhat impoverished in the process. 
RFCs slowly became conclusions rather than debates.
58
 
Increasingly, they also became part of a system of discussion and 
implementation in which participants created working software as 
part of an experiment in developing the standard, after which there 
was more discussion, then perhaps more implementation, and finally, 
a standard. The RFC process was a way to condense the process of 
standardization and validation into implementation; which is to say, 
the proof of open systems was in the successful connection of diverse 
networks, and the creation of a standard became a kind of ex post 
facto rubber-stamping of this demonstration. Any further 
improvement of the standard hinged on an improvement on the 
standard implementation because the standards that resulted were 
freely and widely available:  
A user could request an RFC by email from his host computer 
and have it automatically delivered to his mailbox. . . . RFCs 
were also shared freely with official standards bodies, 
manufacturers and vendors, other working groups, and 
universities. None of the RFCs were ever restricted or 
classified. This was no mean feat when you consider that they 
were being funded by DoD during the height of the Cold 
War.
59
 
The OSI protocols were not nearly so freely available. The ironic 
reversal—the transparency of a military-research program versus the 
opacity of a Geneva-based international-standards organization—
goes a long way toward explaining the reasons why geeks might find 
the story of TCP/IP‘s success to be so appealing. It is not that geeks 
are secretly militaristic, but that they delight in such surprising 
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reversals, especially when those reversals exemplify the kind of ad 
hoc, clever solution to problems of coordination that the RFC process 
does. The RFC process is not the only alternative to a consensus-
oriented model of standardization pioneered in the international 
organizations of Geneva, but it is a specific response to a 
reorientation of power and knowledge that was perhaps more 
―intuitively obvious‖ to the creators of Arpanet and the Internet, with 
its unusual design goals and context, than it would have been to the 
purveyors of telecommunications systems with over a hundred years 
of experience in connecting people in very specific and established 
ways. 
VII. SUCCESS AS FAILURE 
By 1985, OSI was an official standard, one with widespread 
acceptance by engineers, by the government and military (the 
―GOSIP‖ standard), and by a number of manufacturers, the most 
significant of which was General Motors, with its Manufacturing 
Automation Protocol (―MAP‖). In textbooks and handbooks of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, OSI was routinely referred to as the 
inevitable standard—which is to say, it had widespread legitimacy as 
the standard that everyone should be implementing—but few 
implementations existed. Many of the textbooks on networking from 
the late 1980s, especially those slanted toward a theoretical 
introduction, give elaborate detail of the OSI reference model—a 
generation of students in networking was no doubt trained to 
understand the world in terms of OSI—but the ambivalence 
continued. Indeed, the most enduring legacy of the creation of the 
OSI protocols is not the protocols themselves (some of which, like 
ASN.1, are still widely used today), but the pedagogical model: the 
―7 layer stack‖ that is as ubiquitous in networking classes and 
textbooks as UNIX is in operating-systems classes.
60
 
 
 60. This can be clearly seen, for instance, by comparing the various editions of the main 
computer-networking textbooks. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. COMER, INTERNETWORKING WITH 
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But in the late 1980s, the ambivalence turned to confusion. With 
OSI widely recognized as the standard, TCP/IP began to show up in 
more and more actually existing systems. For example, in Computer 
Network Architectures and Protocols, Carl Sunshine says, ―Now in 
the late 1980s, much of the battling seems over. CCITT and ISO have 
aligned their efforts, and the research community seems largely to 
have resigned itself to OSI.‖61 But immediately afterward he adds:  
It is ironic that while a consensus has developed that OSI is 
indeed inevitable, the TCP/IP protocol suite has achieved 
widespread deployment, and now serves as a de facto 
interoperability standard. . . . It appears that the vendors were 
unable to bring OSI products to market quickly enough to 
satisfy the demand for interoperable systems, and TCP/IP were 
there to fill the need.
62
 
The more implementations that appeared, the less secure the 
legitimate standard seemed to be. By many accounts the OSI 
specifications were difficult to implement, and the yearly 
networking-industry ―Interop‖ conferences became a regular locale 
for the religious war between TCP/IP and OSI. The success of 
TCP/IP over OSI reflects the reorientation of knowledge and power 
to which Free Software is also a response. The reasons for the 
success are no doubt complex, but the significance of the success of 
TCP/IP illustrates three issues: availability, modifiability, and 
serendipity. 
A. Availability  
The TCP/IP standards themselves were free to anyone and 
available over TCP/IP networks, exemplifying one of the aspects of a 
recursive public: that the only test of participation in a TCP/IP-based 
internetwork is the fact that one possesses or has created a device that 
implements TCP/IP. Access to the network is contingent on the 
interoperability of the networks. The standards were not ―published‖ 
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ARCHITECTURES AND PROTOCOLS 3, 5 (Carl A. Sunshine ed., 2d ed. 1989). 
 62. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/7
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Conceiving Open Systems 175 
 
 
in a conventional sense, but made available through the network 
itself, without any explicit intellectual property restrictions, and 
without any fees or restrictions on who could access them. By 
contrast, ISO standards are generally not circulated freely, but sold 
for relatively high prices, as a source of revenue, and under the 
general theory that only legitimate corporations or government 
agencies would need access to them. 
Related to the availability of the standards is the fact that the 
standards process that governed TCP/IP was itself open to anyone, 
whether corporate, military or academic. The structure of governance 
of the Internet Engineering Task Force (―IETF‖) and the Internet 
Society (―ISOC‖) allowed for anyone with the means available to 
attend the ―working group‖ meetings that would decide on the 
standards that would be approved. Certainly this does not mean that 
the engineers and defense contractors responsible actively sought out 
corporate stakeholders or imagined the system to be ―public‖ in any 
dramatic fashion; however, compared to the system in place at most 
standards bodies (in which members are usually required to be the 
representatives of corporations or governments), the IETF allowed 
individuals to participate qua individuals.
63
 
B. Modifiability  
Implementations of TCP/IP were widely available, bootstrapped 
from machine to machine along with the UNIX operating system and 
other tools (e.g., the implementation of TCP/IP in BSD 4.2, the BSD 
version of UNIX), generally including the source code. An existing 
implementation is a much more expressive and usable object than a 
specification for an implementation, and though ISO generally 
prepares reference implementations for such standards, in the case of 
OSI there were many fewer implementations to work with or build 
on. Because multiple implementations of TCP/IP already existed, it 
was easy to validate: did your (modified) implementation work with 
the other existing implementations? By contrast, OSI would provide 
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independent validation, but the in situ validation through connection 
to other OSI networks was much harder to achieve, there being too 
few of them, or access being restricted. It is far easier to build on an 
existing implementation and to improve on it piecemeal, or even to 
rewrite it completely, using its faults as a template (so to speak), than 
it is to create an implementation based solely on a standard. The 
existence of the TCP/IP protocols in BSD 4.2 not only meant that 
people who installed that operating system could connect to the 
Internet easily, at a time when it was by no means standard to be able 
to do so, but it also meant that manufacturers or tinkerers could 
examine the implementation in BSD 4.2 as the basis for a modified, 
or entirely new, implementation. 
C. Serendipity  
Perhaps most significant, the appearance of widespread and 
popular applications that were dependent on TCP/IP gave those 
protocols an inertia that OSI, with relatively few such applications, 
did not have. The most important of these by far was the World Wide 
Web (the http protocol, the HTML mark-up language, and 
implementations of both servers, such as libwww, and clients, such as 
Mosaic and Netscape). The basic components of the Web were made 
to work on top of the TCP/IP networks, like other services that had 
already been designed (ftp, telnet, gopher, archie, etc.); thus, Tim 
Berners-Lee, who co-invented the World Wide Web, could also rely 
on the availability and openness of previous work for his own 
protocols. In addition, Berners-Lee and CERN (the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research) dedicated their work to the 
public domain more or less immediately, essentially allowing anyone 
to do anything they wished with the system they had cobbled 
together.
64
 From the perspective of the tension between TCP/IP and 
OSI, the World Wide Web was thus what engineers call a ―killer 
app,‖ because its existence actually drove individuals and 
corporations to make decisions (in favor of TCP/IP) that it might not 
have made otherwise. 
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CONCLUSION 
Openness and open systems are key to understanding the practices 
of Free Software: the open-systems battles of the 1980s set the 
context for Free Software, leaving in their wake a partially articulated 
infrastructure of operating systems, networks, and markets that 
resulted from figuring out open systems. The failure to create a 
standard UNIX operating system opened the door for Microsoft 
Windows NT, but it also set the stage for the emergence of the Linux-
operating-system kernel to emerge and spread. The success of the 
TCP/IP protocols forced multiple competing networking schemes 
into a single standard—and a singular entity, the Internet—that 
carried with it a set of built-in goals that mirror the moral-technical 
order of Free Software. 
This ―infrastructure‖ is at once technical (protocols and standards 
and implementations) and moral (expressing ideas about the proper 
order and organization of commercial efforts to provide high-tech 
software, networks, and computing power). As with the invention of 
UNIX, the opposition commercial-noncommercial (or its 
doppelgangers public-private, profit-nonprofit, capitalist-socialist, 
etc.) doesn‘t capture the context. Constraints on the ability to 
collaborate, compete, or withdraw are in the making here through the 
technical and moral imaginations of the actors involved: from the 
corporate behemoths like IBM to (onetime) startups like Sun to the 
independent academics and amateurs and geeks with stakes in the 
new high-tech world of networks and software. 
The creation of a UNIX market failed. The creation of a legitimate 
international networking standard failed. But they were local failures 
only. They opened the doors to new forms of commercial practice 
(exemplified by Netscape and the dotcom boom) and new kinds of 
politicotechnical fractiousness (ICANN, IPv6, and ―net neutrality‖). 
But the blind spot of open systems-intellectual property—at the heart 
of these failures also provided the impetus for some geeks, 
entrepreneurs, and lawyers to start figuring out the legal and 
economic aspects of Free Software, and it initiated a vibrant 
experimentation with copyright licensing and with forms of 
innovative coordination and collaboration built on top of the rapidly 
spreading protocols of the Internet. 
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